What needs to be decided?
Europe is structurally dependent on the United States for key capabilities that no European state can provide alone. ESDA is a concrete proposal for a new treaty-based alliance — adding shared capabilities on top of national defence forces without replacing NATO.
The next 0–12 months (Phase 0) are the critical window: this is where the foundation is laid. Countries not participating now will have no influence on the design of the treaty.
What happens if Europe fails to act?
Continued dependence on a single ally whose strategic priorities are shifting. In a crisis, European countries will be left with large national armies that cannot coordinate, lack shared logistics, and have no access to the capabilities that determine modern warfare: ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), aerial refuelling, precision missiles and cyber defence.
The threats Europe will need to manage in 15, 20 or 30 years are unknown today. ESDA is Europe's insurance against the unknown — not only the answer to what we already see.
The cost of inaction is a permanently vulnerable and ineffective European defence.
1. The problem — and the cost of inaction
Europe has never spent more on defence. Yet Europe lacks the capabilities required for independent action in a major conflict on European soil. The cause is structural — not budgetary.
- US dependence. Europe cannot move and supply larger forces without US strategic airlift and aerial refuelling. This dependence is reinforced by the permanent stationing of approximately 100,000 US troops in Europe, which creates a structurally unsustainable dependency. In a situation where the United States shifts focus to the Pacific or withdraws support, European forces are in practice immobilised.
- EU frameworks cannot deliver — and never will. PESCO (the EU's defence cooperation framework) and EDA (the European Defence Agency) have not produced a standing force, a real command structure or common standardisation. The EU's unanimity requirement does not merely prevent rapid decisions — it structurally blocks the establishment of the type of alliance ESDA requires. ESDA is not possible within EU frameworks. This is why the EDE Treaty is necessary. The EU's own foreign policy representative, Kaja Kallas, openly acknowledged at MSC 2026 that she did not know how a European army would function — an admission that the necessary command structure neither exists nor can be created within EU frameworks.
- Fragmentation wastes resources. Europe spends large sums, but on many different platforms, parallel logistics systems and short production runs. The money does not generate the deterrence effect and strategic agency it should.
2. ESDA — what it concretely is
ESDA is not a European army and not an alternative to NATO. It is a shared capability layer — four pillars — that delivers what no single state can provide alone, and which requires a new independent treaty: the European Defence Ecosystem (EDE) outside EU frameworks.
| Pillar |
What it delivers |
Why it is the key |
Pillar 1 — ERF
response force |
Maritime and littoral response force. 70–110,000 military and civilian personnel. Drone carriers (EAC), missile platforms (AMP), layered air defence. |
The visible, mobile deterrent. Can operate independently for 60–90 days. |
Pillar 2 — EIA
intelligence |
European satellite constellation (Europe currently operates only 49 military satellites compared to the US's 246), AEW&C aircraft, HALE drones, Cyber Command and AI analysis platform. |
Europe gains its own common operational picture. Independence from US ISR capabilities. |
Pillar 3 — ESCL
logistics |
200 transport aircraft, 40 aerial refuelling aircraft (MRTT), sealift (Ro-Ro), shared stockpiles at five strategic hubs. |
European forces can move and be sustained. Ends dependence on US strategic airlift. The MRTT fleet and EIA's common operational picture together make national combat aircraft far more effective as one coordinated European air force — without ESDA needing its own combat aircraft. |
Pillar 4 — EDPA
standards & procurement |
Common standards, procurement and industrial readiness. Plans for rapid scaling of ammunition and missiles. |
Money is used more effectively. Europe can produce enough in wartime. |
Relationship with NATO: ESDA does not duplicate NATO. ESDA forces can be made available for NATO-led operations. Standards are built on NATO STANAGs. Planning is conducted in coordination with SHAPE. ESDA addresses the European capability gap — NATO addresses the collective defence article and nuclear planning.
3. Governance and sovereignty
The EDE Treaty establishes ESDA outside EU treaty frameworks — no EU unanimity requirement, full participation of the UK and Norway possible. The ESDA Council (defence ministers) takes decisions by two-thirds majority. No single state holds a veto right in day-to-day operations.
The Tier model protects national sovereignty
The critical tension in any supranational defence body is: who decides when? The Tier model resolves this:
| Tier |
What |
Examples |
Decision |
| A |
Core capabilities and support |
ISR, aerial refuelling, transport, cyber defence |
ESDA Council two-thirds majority. Pre-authorised — no individual case-by-case approval required. |
| B |
Limited combat operations |
Critical infrastructure protection, counter-piracy, limited precision strikes |
ESDA Council two-thirds majority. Normally pre-authorised via national framework legislation. |
| C |
Large-scale combat participation |
Prolonged high-intensity operations |
ESDA Council two-thirds majority + separate national participation decision in each country. |
Why two-thirds — and not unanimity or a simple majority?
Europe has two models to learn from — both are unworkable for ESDA. The US president can order operations within hours. This provides agency, but is inconceivable in an alliance of equal states. The EU requires unanimity in defence matters — thereby giving a single country the power to paralyse all others. ESDA chooses a third way: a two-thirds majority ensures a substantial, legitimate mandate behind every decision — but no single state can block. A three-quarters requirement would recreate the EU's problem in another guise. A simple majority would drag a reluctant minority along against their will. Two-thirds is the precise threshold at which ESDA can act — and not be paralysed.
Each country adopts a national ESDA framework law upon ratification. The framework law pre-authorises Tier A and the majority of Tier B, establishes access to infrastructure and ensures parliamentary information — without paralysing decision-making through demands for case-by-case approval.
4. Personnel — size and composition
At full force target, ESDA will be manned by approximately 177,000 personnel across the four pillars and shared structures.
| Pillar |
Function |
Personnel |
| Pillar 1 — ERF |
Maritime/littoral response force |
~110,000 |
| Pillar 2 — EIA |
ISR, space, cyber and AI |
~20,000 |
| Pillar 3 — ESCL |
Strategic airlift, aerial refuelling and logistics |
~35,000 |
| Pillar 4 — EDPA |
Standardisation and procurement |
~5,000 |
| Shared structures |
The Citadel and others |
~7,000 |
| Total |
|
~177,000 |
Personnel comprise a combination of directly employed ESDA staff, long-term seconded national personnel and contracted specialists. The rotation system ensures close ties to national environments.
5. Economics — not new money
The most important political argument: ESDA does not require money beyond NATO's long-term 5% target for defence and security. A clearly defined share of this framework is ring-fenced for shared capabilities — the rest remains national. EU member states' combined defence budgets rose from €218bn in 2021 to €343bn in 2024 — the money is already moving. ESDA's ~€57bn/year represents less than 15% of this figure and constitutes the shared capability layer that no single state can provide alone.
ESDA is a reallocation, not an additional bill. The money will be spent regardless — the question is whether it is spent in fragmented national silos or pooled at the European level.
Two scenarios
| |
GDP base |
Build-up (year 1–15) |
Operating (from year 15) |
Scenario A
All EU + UK + Norway |
~€24,000bn/year |
0.28% → ~€67bn/year |
0.24% → ~€57bn/year |
Scenario B
Core group (~15 countries incl. DK) |
~€22,000bn/year |
0.30% → ~€67bn/year |
0.26% → ~€57bn/year |
The absolute budget is identical in both scenarios (~€67bn/year during build-up). Scenario B starts with fewer countries and therefore a higher GDP share per country — but is not a permanent inner circle. The EDE Treaty is designed for easy accession, and the GDP contribution per country falls as more join.
Contingency reserve: A 20% reserve (~€12bn/year in operating phase) is held in a shared, non-earmarked ESDA reserve. Released only by a two-thirds decision of the ESDA Council. Used to close critical gaps and manage price increases on key components.
6. What is required now — Phase 0
ESDA is built up over 15 years. But the window for political influence over the treaty's design is now. Phase 0 (0–12 months) is about establishing the foundation that determines everything that follows.
| Task in Phase 0 |
Content |
| Founding group (5–10 countries) |
Political declaration of intent to establish ESDA. Agreement on the EDE Treaty's fundamental principles and division of responsibilities. An independent treaty authority appointed. |
| EDE Treaty text |
Drafted and negotiated. The key principle is that ESDA is shaped without any single country's interests dominating the design. Standardised national framework laws prepared in parallel for ratification. |
| The Citadel — interim HQ |
Located in Brussels. The Triumvirate (Civil Director, Chief of Defence, High Representative) appointed. |
| Parliamentary oversight |
Oversight council with parliamentarians from the founding countries. Independent audit follows the build-up from day one. |
| Four 'must wins' |
Visible results within 24 months: common ammunition contracts (EDPA), aerial refuelling agreements (ESCL), AEW&C aircraft and first LEO satellites (EIA), first drone carrier (ERF). |
Phase 1 (year 1–2): Ratification and launch of key programmes. Phase 2 (year 3–7): Initial Operational Capability in all pillars, ERF at 70–80,000. Gate 1 (end of year 7): Mid-term review — programmes that have not reached IOC milestones are terminated. Phase 3 (year 8–15): Full Operational Capability.
7. Three recommendations
There are three decisions that must be taken now. They are interdependent — but the first is the prerequisite for the other two.
A founding group of 5–10 countries lays the foundation for the EDE Treaty. Countries participating now will have influence over the treaty's design — including decision rules, the funding model and the Tier structure. Countries that wait will accede to terms set by others. The government should, before Q3 2026, formally declare its intent to participate in the founding group and actively engage in the initial negotiations.
Deadline: Q3 2026 — political declaration
Participation in the founding group and Phase 0 is not cost-free: treaty negotiations, contributions to The Citadel establishment and preparation of the national framework law require resources. The appropriation is small relative to the long-term commitment — but critical for maintaining negotiating strength. The funds should be allocated in the defence budget for 2026/2027.
Deadline: Finance Act 2026/2027
The national ESDA framework law is a prerequisite for Tier A and B to be activated automatically. Drafting the law requires clarification of constitutional frameworks, division of responsibility and parliamentary procedures — this takes time. A legislative preparatory committee should be established now, so that a completed legal text is ready for ratification when the EDE Treaty is available. Waiting until the treaty is in place means losing 12–18 months.
Deadline: Establish committee: Q3 2026